Abstract. Consider the well-known oracle attack: somehow one gets a certain computation result as a function of a secret key from the secret key owner and tries to extract some information on the secret key. This attacking scenario is well understood in the cryptographic community. However, there are many protocols based on the discrete logarithm problem that turn out to leak many of the secret key bits from this oracle attack, unless suitable checkings are carried out. In this paper we present a key recovery attack on various discrete log-based schemes working in a prime order subgroup. Our attack may reveal part of, or the whole secret key in most Di e-Hellman-type key exchange protocols and some applications of ElGamal encryption and signature schemes.
Introduction
Many cryptographic protocols have been developed based on the discrete logarithm problem. The main objective of developers is to design a protocol that is as di cult to break as the underlying discrete logarithm problem under some reasonable assumptions. On the other hand, the goal of attackers is to nd a way to extract the secret key involved or to pretend to be a legitimate user without knowing the secret key. Though provable security guarantees that there is no e cient attack on the protocol, it should be carefully interpreted for practical security; the most important would be to use secure parameters and follow the assumed conditions or requirements as closely as possible. As an illustrative example, we refer to two recent papers on ElGamal-type signature schemes; one regarding security proof by Pointcheval and Stern 34] and the other regarding signature forgery by Bleichenbacher 4 ] (see also Stern 39] for further discussions on their apparent contradiction).
The purpose of this paper is to point out the insecurity of various discrete log-based schemes using a prime order subgroup. More speci cally, we present a key recovery attack on these protocols, which can nd all or part of the secret key bits. Our attack is closely related to the choice of parameters and the checking of protocol variables. Thus, as is usual, our attack, once identi ed, can be easily prevented by adding suitable checking steps or by using`secure' parameters. Here`secure' means that the parameters are secure against our attack. And this also implies that the usual parameters commonly used in the literature are not secure against our attack. The presented attack demonstrates the importance of checking protocol variables in designing discrete log-based schemes.
Pohlig-Hellman Decomposition and Pollard's Methods : The discrete logarithm problem over Z p can be broken down into a number of small such sub-problems de ned over small order subgroups of Z p (Pohlig-Hellman decomposition 33]).
Then these sub-problems can be solved using Pollard's rho and lambda methods 35] and the resulting partial logarithms can be combined using the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) to give the pursued discrete logarithm.
For simplicity, suppose that p?1 = Q n i=1 q i (q i prime). Let be a generator of Z p . Given y = x mod p, we can reduce the problem of nding x mod p?1 to the following sub-problems: nd x i = x mod q i from y i = y (p?1)=q i = x i i mod p for each i, where i = (p?1)=q i (an element of order q i ). Each such sub-problem can be solved using Pollard's rho method (see 40] for linear speedup with multiple processors). Once x i 's are found for all i, they can be combined using the CRT to yield the logarithm x mod p ? 1. Pollard's rho method can compute a logarithm in a subgroup of prime order q in time O( p q), while Pollard's lambda method can compute a logarithm that is known to lie within some restricted interval of width w in time O( p w). Thus, both methods have similar square-root running time for a given size of an unknown exponent. In particular, the lambda method is very useful for computing a logarithm in a prime order subgroup when part of the logarithm is known. (For details, see van Oorschot and Wiener 41] .)
The Attacking Scenario : In this paper we pay our attention to DL-based schemes using a prime order subgroup. Thus, as is usual, we assume that a prime p is chosen at random such that p?1 has a large prime factor q. Let g be an element of order q and ord( ) denote the order of mod p. Then, for a given y such that y = g x mod p, it is completely infeasible under current technology to nd x using Pollard's rho method, if we take for example jqj = 160, since it requires about 2 80 operations. Our observation is that if we could obtain z = x mod p somehow by attacking a protocol, where = Q i (a product of distinct smooth order elements mod p), then we could nd x modulo ord( ) using the Pohlig-Hellman decomposition. Here we assume that (p ? 1)=q may have many small prime factors, which is usually the case for a randomly chosen prime p. And nally the remaining part of x could be found from the public key y using Pollard's lambda method. A special case of the attack is to nd x mod ord( ), given z = f( x mod p) for any function f. In this case, one can nd j = x mod ord( ) by checking that z = f( j mod p) for j = 0; 1; ; ord( ) ? 1, where we assume that the range of f is large enough compared to , so that the probability of collisions occurring under f is negligible, which is usually the case in most instances of our attack.
The main problem in the above attacking scenario is how to obtain a PohligHellman decomposition for the secret key. This should be impossible in welldesigned protocols. However, we could nd many DL-based schemes susceptible to the above attack in the literature. Most Di e-Hellman type key exchange protocols are vulnerable to the above attack. Other examples include shared decryption of ElGamal encryption, shared veri cation of ElGamal signatures and undeniable signatures. Our attack was possible in all these schemes, since the involved parties do not check relevant protocol variables. Though there are several papers pointing out the importance of checking public parameters and protocol variables (e.g., see 4,42,1,41,2]) in DH key exchange and digital signature schemes, no literature addresses such an explicit attack revealing the involved secret. Our attack may nd the whole secret key in many cases.
Related Work : Previous work most relevant to our attack is the middleperson attack on the original Di e-Hellman key exchange protocol 16] (see 41, 2] 1 The above attack motivates the use of a prime order subgroup, which also substantially increases the e ciency in computation and parameter generation (see 41, 2] for further discussions). Thus most DL-based schemes have been designed using a prime order subgroup since its rst invention by Schnorr 38] . However, this paper will show potential weaknesses in such a setting. Our attack on key exchange protocols is quite similar to the above attack, except that our target protocols use a prime order subgroup and that our objective is to nd the long-term secret key of the involved party (usually by the other legitimate party). Our attack can be applied to any protocol involving a DH shared secret.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: We present in Sec.2 a key recovery attack on DH-type key exchange protocols and in Sec.3 a similar attack on other DL-based schemes such as ElGamal encryption and signatures. Sec.4 deals with the generation of secure primes and public key certi cates as possible countermeasures to minimize security loss by our attack. And we conclude in Sec.5.
Extracting Secret Keys in Key Exchange Protocols
One of the well-known design principles for public key protocols states that a message received should not be assumed to have a particular form unless it can be checked 1]. In particular, it is very dangerous to apply one's secret to a number received from the other. However, this principle is hard to apply to Di e-Hellman-type key exchange protocols. This has given rise to a lot of attacks or weaknesses under a variety of attacking scenarios. Most attacks aim at nding a session key (e.g., see 10, 43] ) or causing authentication failure (e.g., see 27]). In this section we present a key recovery attack that can be applied to many DH-type key exchange protocols published in the literature 2 unless proper precautions are taken additionally.
Basic Di e-Hellman Key Exchange
We rst consider the case where a user A successfully obtained a certi cate on the public key y A = g x A mod p with of small order mod p. This is possible unless a certi cation authority checks that y q A = 1 mod p before issuing a certi cate for y A . The CA usually requires that each user prove knowledge of a secret key corresponding to the public key to be certi ed, since otherwise there exist some protocols that can be attacked with a faked public key (e.g., see 27]). However, even in this case it may still be possible to register a public key of the form y A = g x A mod p if it is not checked that y q A = 1 mod p. For example, suppose that for registration the CA requires a user's digital signature on the certi cate message which contains all necessary information for certi cation, including the public key, as de ned by X.509. In this case it is easy for A to generate a valid signature corresponding to the public key y A = g x A mod p when ord( ) is small. For example, suppose that Schnorr's signature scheme 38] is used for this purpose. Given message m, A can nd r 0 2 (0; ord( )] such that r 0 = h( r 0 g k mod p; m) mod ord( ) in about ord( ) steps, where k 2 R Z q and h denotes a secure hash function. Thus A can generate a signature fr; sg on m by computing r = h( r 0 g k mod p; m) and s = k ? xr mod q. It is easy to see that the resulting fr; sg is a valid signature on m with the public key y A = g x A mod p. On the other hand, suppose that Schnorr's identi cation scheme is used instead. Then A can pass the protocol with probability 1=ord( ) on average, irrespective of the size of a challenge by B (A similar observation has been made before by Burmester 9] ). Therefore, it is essential that the CA should rst check that y q A = 1 mod p.
We now present a key recovery attack under the assumption that an attacking user i has a public key y i = g x i mod p. This attack will demonstrate the importance of the checking step in the certi cation process. We rst consider the zero-message DH key exchange with xed keys (e.g., used in 22]) 3 apply to this protocol is that the same random secret k i is used for authentication and session key computation. This shows that a robust protocol should avoid using the same secret (even if it is a one-time random number) for two di erent purposes 1]. In this respect the approach taken in the STS 17] and SKEME 21] seems to be a better way to design key exchange protocols.
Authenticated key Exchange
The attack presented above can be easily prevented by a proper precaution in the certi cate issuing process. We now extend our attack to the case where each user has a correct public key. As an example, we consider the following key exchange protocol, which is an authenticated version of the MTI (Matsumoto- Takashima The above attack may be repeated using di erent smooth order elements for which it is feasible to do the exhaustive search. Thus if p ? 1 has several prime factors of small size (say, less than 40 bits), then it would be possible to nd the whole secret in reasonable time. We note that the attack can be mounted against any authenticated key exchange protocol as long as authentication is performed using the shared secret (note that such authentication is possible only if each user's secret key is involved in the computation of the shared secret). This implies that almost all key exchange protocols providing explicit authentication without using a separate authentication channel (e.g., as in STS 17] or SKEME 21]) may be vulnerable to our attack.
Our attack can also be applied to key exchange protocols with implicit authentication, since the agreed upon session key will be used anyway in later communications. For example, suppose that user A mounted the attack in the original MTI protocol, where each user exchanges random exponential r i and computes the session key as above. Now, if user B rst uses the resulting session key for message authentication (or key authentication), A obtains a known equation involving the session key computed by B. Then the situation, in view of our attack, is the same as in the above authenticated protocol. On the other hand, if B sends a ciphertext for an unknown message, then A can nd the intended partial secret by decrypting the ciphertext with all possible values of the session key that B is supposed to compute and then nding a meaningful message. Note that usual known-key attacks assume knowledge of the whole shared secret from which the session key is derived (e.g., see 43, 10] ), but in our attack it is su cient to obtain any function of the shared secret (even a ciphertext su ces).
We next show that some key exchange protocols using a signature scheme for authentication may also be vulnerable to our attack. of the attack with of a di erent order does not help to nd further bits of the secret in this case, since a di erent k B is used each time and ord( ) does not divide q.
The attack described in this section can be easily prevented by checking that r q i = 1 mod p for each random exponential exchanged before raising it to the secret key. However, this considerably increases the computational load. A better solution would be to choose a prime p such that (p ? 1)=2q has prime factors at least larger than q (see Sec.4). Such a p only leaks the parity bit of the secret key by our attack. Note that no key exchange protocol can protect the parity bit of the involved secret if the order of the received number is not checked as explained above, since there always exist an element of order 2 (i.e., p-1). This is also true for the following one-way key exchange protocol useful for email Note the e ciency of the above attack. Unlike in key exchange protocols, where the attacker can only obtain a function of the shared secret (e.g., a hash value), in the above scheme the attacker has direct access to the shared secret itself (i.e., a value exponentiated with the secret key). This allows the attacker to get a Pohlig-Hellman decomposition for the secret key. Since now Pollard'smethod can be used to solve the decomposed problems, it would be quite feasible to use a of order about 80 bits. Thus, for a random prime p such that qjp ? 1 and jqj = 160, the attack could reveal the whole secret key in most cases.
Anonymous channels proposed by Park et al. 30 ] uses a special case of the threshold cryptosystem described above, i.e., the case of t = n. The anonymous channel is primarily used to protect the secrecy of votes in electronic voting schemes. Later P tzmann 32] developed successful attacks on these channels. 
Undeniable Signatures
Our attack can also be applied to some digital signature applications. The most obvious case is to produce an undeniable signature on message m 2 Z q as m x mod p without checking that m q = 1 mod p, where x is the signer's secret key. We could nd several other examples in the literature.
As a rst example, we consider the validator issuing protocol by Chaum and Pedersen (see Sec.4 in 13]). The purpose of this protocol is that a center Z issues a validator to a`wallet with observer' (consisting of a computer C and a tamper-proof module T embedded inside C). The validator is an unlinkable certi cate for the public key y T = g x T of T. In some steps of the protocol the computer C blinds y T as m = y k T mod p with random k and sends it to the center Z, who then returns z 0 = m x Z mod p. Obviously, if C sends m = y k T mod p with = Q i , it can nd x Z mod ord( ) from z q 0 = ( q ) x Z mod p using the Pohlig-Hellman method. Note that C can still obtain the desired signature by computing z 0 ?x Z mod p after nding x Z mod ord( ). The same attack can be applied to its privacy enhanced version 14] if the signer does not check that m q = 1 mod p. The authors may omit this checking step in the thought that C can only obtain an undeniable signature for a random message, but this omission enables a fatal attack as shown above.
In Brands's electronic cash scheme using a wallet with observers 6] (see 7] for more details), each user computes I = g u 1 mod p with u 2 R Z q and sends it to the bank, which generates a signature z = (Ig 2 ) x mod p (g 1 ; g 2 generators of a subgroup of order q). In this case the user must prove to the bank that he knows u since I corresponds to the account number of the user (see also 11]). Thus our attack is not applicable here. However, as noted in Sec.2.1, it is essential to check I q = 1 mod p at the begining of the proof if a Schnorr-type identi cation scheme is used for this purpose (this is the case in 7]). Otherwise, the user can pass the proof with I = g u 1 mod p in success probability 1=ord( ). The successful pass will be fatal in this system: Not only the user can mount our attack to nd partial information on the secret x, but also he can spend the same coin multiple times without being identi ed.
Another possibility for the attack exists in the con rmation protocol of undeniable signatures 12,8] and designated con rmer signatures 29]. For example, consider the convertible undeniable signature scheme by Boyar et al. 8] . 4 In this scheme the signer S possesses two secret/public key pairs, fx 2 R Z q ; y = g x mod pg and fz 2 R Z q ; u = g z mod pg. The signature on message m is a triple ft; r; sg, where t = g k 1 mod p, r = g k 2 mod p and s = k ?15. S checks that ch = w a g b mod p. if it holds true, then S reveals c to V .
Otherwise, S stops the protocol. 6. V checks that h 1 = w a g b+c mod p and h 2 = v a u b+c mod p.
This protocol is complete, sound and proven zero-knowledge. However, suppose that the veri er V sends, as a challenge in step 2, any value of order q multiplied by small order elements, say ch = g b mod p. Then the received value h 2 in step 3 satis es h q 2 = ( q ) z mod p, from which the veri er can nd z mod ord( ). This shows that the con rmation protocol cannot be zero-knowledge against a dishonest veri er, unless the prover checks that ch q = 1 mod p in step 3. In a variant by Pedersen 31] , S computes h 1 ; h 2 as h 1 = (ch) c mod p with c 2 R Z q and h 2 = h z 1 mod p. This variant is also vulnerable to our attack, since one can still obtain the equation h q 2 = (h q 1 ) z mod p by sending ch = g b mod p (here note that ord(h q 1 ) = ord( )). The above attack suggests that a prime p should be chosen as p = 2q + 1 (q prime) if an undeniable signature is computed as m x mod p and if the above protocol is to be used for con rmation, as in Chaum's undeniable signature 12]. 5 On the other hand, Jakobsson and Yung 19] proposed an oblivious decision proof protocol for proving validity/invalidity of undeniable signatures, where the prover does not have to know whether the signature in question is valid or not. Thus the protocol does not necessarily require the message m to be in Z q .
They choose the system parameters for use in Chaum's scheme as: p = ql + 1 (p; q prime, l integer), g an element of order q and fx 2 R Z q ; y = g x mod pg as the secret/public key pair of the signer. However, careful examination shows that their oblivious protocol with such parameters is also vulnerable to our attack. This protocol cannot be repaired by simply adding checking steps as noted above. To avoid our attack, we have to choose p as p = 2q + 1 (q prime). Or we may use the full multiplicative group Z ? p as the underlying group.
We note that the signer or the con rmer(s) must verify the validity of a signature before executing the con rmation protocol if distinct protocols are used for con rmation and disavowal. 6 Otherwise, the veri er may change the rst component t of the signature as t 0 = t mod p and requests S to con rm its validity by sending ft 0 ; r; sg. Then V will be able to obtain z mod p at the end of the protocol, since the check in step 5 will succeed if V sends ch = (w 0 ) a g b mod p with w 0 = (t 0 ) t 0 h(m) mod p in step 2. If the secret z is distributed into a set of designated con rmers 31, 29] , an authorized subset of con rmers should run a shared veri cation protocol to validate the signature. Then there may exist 5 Note that it is infeasible to generate m as an element of order q for any meaningful message or its hash value if q is chosen small compared to p. Thus there is no way to detect our attack unless p is chosen as p = 2q + 1. Alternatively, we may choose g as a generator of Z ? p . Then our attack will be useless; the public key itself already reveals the smooth part of the secret key. 6 There is another weakness when the validity of a signature is not veri ed before con rmation, as described in Appendix A in 19]: If a veri er who does not have a valid signature for m is allowed to participate in the con rmation protocol, then the veri er can easily obtain a valid signature for m.
another possibility for the combiner to mount a similar attack to nd secret shares of con rmers as in the shared decryption of ElGamal ciphertexts (see Sec.3.1), unless each con rmer checks that w q = 1 mod p.
Generating and Registering Public Parameters
The presented attack shows that it is essential in discrete log-based schemes using a prime order subgroup to check the order of received numbers before applying the secret key. However, such explicit checking requires additional exponentiation. As a better countermeasure, we recommend to use a secure prime, i.e., a prime p such that (p ? 1)=2q is also prime or each prime factor of (p ? 1)=2q is larger than q. (see also 25] for a method of generating primes which can substantially reduce the modular reduction time and storage usage). Such a prime can be generated much faster than, and seems as strong against any known attack as, a safe prime (i.e., a prime of the form p = 2q + 1 ). This will prevent any potential weakness from the misuse of key parameters. Of course, using the same prime p in di erent primitives may not be desirable in view of security against most discrete logarithm algorithms, such as the index calculus method and the number eld sieve. However, this gives us e ciency in storage and communication.
The attacks presented in this paper and in Menezes et al. 27] show that the CA must check for knowledge of a secret key corresponding to the public key before issuing a certi cate. In particular, the CA and each user must rst check the order of the received base g and public key y. If such an interactive proof is hard to carry out in some environments, we propose to use the following certi cation procedure, which seems to preclude any known weakness even without such a proof. The basic idea is to allow the CA to also contribute to the randomness of a user's secret key. On receiving a user's part of a public key y 0 = g x 0 mod p, the CA computes the actual public key y as y = (y 0 ) a g b mod p, where a = p?1 q c and b; c 2 R Z q . The CA now generates a certi cate for y and sends fa mod q; bg, along with the certi cate, to the user. On receiving fa; bg, the user checks that a 6 = 0 mod q, computes the actual secret key x as x = x 0 a + b mod q and nally checks that the certi ed public key y is equal to his own computation g x mod p. The exponent a makes vanish any component of y 0 which does not belong to the subgroup of order q. This prevents users from registering an improper form of public keys. The multiplicative factor g b mod p makes it impossible for a user to register a public key as a power of other user's public key. This prevents the attack presented in 27]. Furthermore, users' secret keys can be made more pseudorandom by the CA's contribution if the CA is equipped with a true random generator or uses a cryptographically strong pseudorandom generator (in this case we assume that the CA sends fa mod q; bg through a secure channel).
This may be advantageous since most users may not be so careful in choosing their secrets.
Conclusion
We have demonstrated that many discrete logarithm protocols may be insecure against a key recovery attack unless suitable checking steps are added. The presented attack may reveal part of, in many cases the whole, secret key of a victim in a reasonable time for many DL-based schemes published in the literature. The attack exploits small order subgroups in Z p to compute part of the secret key in a protocol working in a subgroup of prime order q. This is possible since in most schemes a prime p is chosen at random such that qjp ? 1. Therefore, our attack can be easily prevented if relevant protocol variables are properly checked, that is, if each party checks that received numbers belong to the underlying subgroup of prime order. However, such explicit checkings substantially decrease e ciency. Thus a better alternative would be to minimize possible leakage of secret key bits by using a secure prime, a prime p such that all prime factors of (p ? 1)=2q are larger than q. Such a prime only leaks one bit of the secret by our attack.
